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Free But Not Independent: The Real
First Amendment Issue for the Press
By JONATHAN MERMIN*
A FUNDAMENTAL TENET of our First Amendment tradition is that
the press does not simply report what public officials say, but acts in-
stead as a "watchdog" over the government.1 The Supreme Court has
declared the importance of "[a] vigorous and dauntless press,"
charged with "vigilantly scrutinizing the official conduct of those who
administer the state" and functioning as "a potent check on arbitrary
action or abuse." 2 These images of autonomous, adversarial journal-
ism go to the heart of what Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart has
described as "the critical role of an independent press" in American
democracy.3 "If it is to perform its constitutional mission," Justice
Stewart has written, "the press must do far more than merely print
public statements or publish prepared handouts."4 None of this, one
might think, would be subject to much debate in the United States.
Indeed, one might say that these truths are held to be self-evident.
What then to make of the following statement by Jim Lehrer of
PBS, in response to a question about why the media failed to focus,
before the Iraq War started, on the problems an occupying army
might expect to confront:
[Tihe word occupation ... was never mentioned in the run-up to
the war. It was liberation. This was [talked about in Washington as]
a war of liberation, not a war of occupation. So as a consequence, those
of us in journalism never even looked at the issue of occupation.5
The media, Lehrer explains, simply focused on what officials in Wash-
ington were talking about. Issues not under discussion inside the gov-
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1. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
2. Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953).
3. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
4. Id.
5. Hardball with Chris Matthews: Interview with fim Lehrer (MSNBC television broadcast
May 12, 2004), transcript available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4969709/ (emphasis ad-
ded) (last visited July 13, 2005).
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ernment in the prewar period did not make the news. So much, then,
for "vigilantly scrutinizing the official conduct of those who adminis-
ter the state."6
Lehrer's account of the relationship between the press and the
government may be unusual for its open acknowledgement ofjournal-
istic deference toward official sources. But it is consistent with a long-
standing pattern observed by journalists and academics who study the
media.7 The tension between our conviction that democracy requires
an independent press and the actual practice of major American news
organizations is the subject of this Article. 8
There is a general understanding that "freedom of the press
means independence from government in decisions about whether
and what to publish."9 Legal academics writing about the media have
for the most part taken for granted that the press does function as an
independent check on the government, focusing instead on more re-
fined concerns, such as whether the media are reporting a diverse
spectrum of viewpoints and fostering meaningful public deliberation
on issues of public concern. 10 The diversity of perspectives in the me-
dia has also been a central concern of the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), which "has long acted on the theory that diver-
sification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by pro-
moting diversity of ... viewpoints."'" This Article does not question
6. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 602.
7. See infra Parts III.A., III.B.
8. The focus here is on the largest and most influential media outlets, newspapers,
and television news. Although the Internet has made it possible for a great number of
voices to cast messages out into the public sphere, few of these voices are heard by mass
audiences. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 286 (2002) ("The new
technologies expand the universe of people offering information, opinion, and other com-
municative content to strangers .... Nevertheless, to the extent these volunteers' web
pages or postings are no more read than were their earlier leaflets when distributed on
street corners, the fact that they now can self-publish may make less difference than they
often naively hope."); TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 171 (1998) (noting that "the public is only selective and semi atten-
tive," and that "[wihether most people would take the time and effort to surf the Net [for
news] on a daily basis is doubtful.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the
traditional media giants have come to dominate cyberspace as well. Id. (observing that the
Internet "relies heavily on preexisting formats and versions of the news," and accurately
predicting (in 1998) that the process of traditional news formats being reproduced on the
Internet "should only accelerate as established news media move onto the Internet").
9. Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between Exemption
and Independence in Newsgathering ly the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895, 896 (1998).
10. See infra Part II.A. The terms "the media" and "the press" are used interchangeably
herein.
11. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978).
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the significance of the diversity objective, but instead challenges the
unspoken premise that the more fundamental goal of the First
Amendment-a press independent of government-is in fact being
achieved by the major American media. 12
Unmentioned in most of the law review commentary on the me-
dia and the First Amendment is this notable fact: social scientists who
study the media have found, and a number of journalists now ac-
knowledge, that the spectrum of viewpoints on government policy re-
ported in the news is a function of the terms and boundaries of policy
debate inside the United States government. 13 This means that per-
spectives that have not first been expressed by government officials
are ignored or marginalized in the news. 14 Although journalists are
quite critical on their own initiative of the perceived personal inade-
quacies of politicians, 15 one does not often see critical perspectives in
the media on the substance of government policy that have not first
been advanced inside the government. 16 This pattern has been most
extensively documented in the realm of foreign policy, which is also
the focus of this Article.' 7
To be clear, the point is not that media coverage necessarily sup-
ports American policy. Because the government is composed of two
major political parties and three branches, often at odds with one an-
other, journalism that reports the news from the vantage point of the
government may encompass vigorous and contentious policy de-
bate.18 But if the spectrum of policy debate in the news is limited to
the spectrum of debate inside the government, the First Amendment
ideal of a press independent of the government is not being
achieved. 19
This phenomenon might not be of great practical significance if
it could be presumed that meritorious arguments on issues of public
concern would find expression somewhere in official Washington, so
that nothing essential would be omitted from media coverage that
12. See infta Part III.
13. See infra Parts III.A., III.B. One law journal article that does make this point is
Robert M. Entman, Putting the First Amendment in its Place: Enhancing American Democracy
Through the Press, 1993 U. CHL LEGAL F. 61, 63 (1993) ("Despite the First Amendment, the
government heavily influences or, in many cases, determines the information that most
Americans receive via the news media.").
14. See infra III.B.
15. See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER 6-7 (1994).
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See infra Part II.E.
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took its cues from the government.20 No such presumption, however,
is warranted, because even in a well-functioning democracy, the spec-
trum of debate among politicians reflects strategic calculations, pursu-
ant to which certain issues and perspectives are emphasized, and
others are ignored, for reasons of perceived electoral advantage that
are often unrelated to any assessment of the merits of policies. 21 A
press that permits official actors to establish the terms and boundaries
of policy debate in the news reinforces the strategic decisions of politi-
cians to highlight certain issues and perspectives and to sidestep
others, instead of offering an independent perspective on govern-
ment policy.22 Such a press is not independent of the government in
this crucial sense and may fail to report key issues and perspectives
that warrant public attention. 23
Legal academics writing about the media and the First Amend-
ment have overlooked this essential feature of the mainstream me-
dia's performance, focusing instead on questions such as whether the
First Amendment directs the press to enhance the quality of public
deliberation in the United States.24 In rightly proclaiming the signifi-
cance of his own work on this topic, Cass R. Sunstein has observed
that it is "ironic that people interested in the theory and practice of
free speech focus on such comparatively trivial issues as commercial
speech, disclosure of the names of rape victims, and controls on ob-
scenity," when in fact "[t] he principal questions for the system of free
expression lie elsewhere," in the inquiry into whether the press is do-
ing enough to promote public deliberation. 25 To this I would add: it is
ironic that Sunstein and others who are concerned that the media are
not making an adequate contribution to American democracy base
their argument on a somewhat inchoate concern that the media
should report a greater diversity of perspectives and do more to en-
rich public deliberation, while passing over the more remarkable de-
parture of the media from the bedrock First Amendment ideal of a
press independent of government.
This Article argues that although American news organizations
are independent of the United States government in a formal legal





24. See infra Part II.A.
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25,
35-36 (1993).
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policy debate in the news is inadequate to fulfill the structural role of
an independent press. This departure from the First Amendment
ideal has significant implications for the constitutionality of policies
aimed at improving the quality of media coverage of public affairs.
26
For if a fundamental concern of the First Amendment is to ensure
that the press is independent of the government, certain policy initia-
tives designed to increase the independence of the press-by foster-
ing the emergence of smaller and more varied media entities that
would be more inclined than large corporate media to feature inde-
pendent reporting-should be constitutional. 27
Part I reviews the public deliberation approach to the media and
the First Amendment, which holds that American democracy needs,
and the First Amendment permits, policy initiatives that would en-
courage the media to report a greater diversity of perspectives and
enrich public deliberation. The focus of this Part is on Sunstein's in-
fluential work.28 Certain weaknesses of this approach as a political and
constitutional argument are identified.
Part II sets out the independence of government approach, using
the Iraq War as an example. After sketching the Supreme Court's un-
derstanding of the First Amendment ideal of a press independent of
government, Part II reviews the observations of prominent journalists
who acknowledge that the media have not been independent of the
United States government in their Iraq War coverage, and describes
the voluminous academic literature documenting the media's reli-
ance on government officials to set the terms and boundaries of for-
eign policy debate in the news. Part II then examines how this
phenomenon has played out around the Iraq War and argues that this
form ofjournalism fails to fulfill the structural role of an independent
press.
Part III describes certain advantages of the independence of gov-
ernment approach as a basis for upholding the constitutionality of
policies designed to improve the quality of media coverage of public
affairs and as a prescription for journalistic practice, and outlines in
broad strokes a strategy for encouraging independent journalism.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See id.
28. See generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH,
17-51 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DPFS].
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I. Public Deliberation
Reading the legal scholarship on the media and the First Amend-
ment, one gets the impression that American journalists are indepen-
dent of the United States government, but that the First Amendment
may be offended by their failure to encourage deliberation on issues
of public concern.2 9 The leading exponent of this argument in recent
years has been Cass R. Sunstein.
A. Promoting Public Deliberation
In his influential work on the media, Sunstein seeks to explain
why certain policy initiatives aimed at improving the quality of media
coverage of public affairs should be permitted under the First Amend-
ment.30 Sunstein begins with the proposition that "a central purpose
of the First Amendment is to ensure a well-functioning democratic
order."131 Sunstein advances what he describes as a "Madisonian con-
ception" of American democracy, which holds that "a well-functioning
system of free expression ... is closely connected to the central consti-
tutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy. '32 In the delibera-
tive process Sunstein envisions, "[e]xisting preferences should be
subjected to general public discussion, rather than taken as the inevi-
table building-blocks for government outcomes. '3 3 In other words,
prevailing wisdom should be investigated, not simply assumed to be
correct.
34
Sunstein outlines two basic requirements for a system of free ex-
pression that meets the needs of deliberative democracy. First, the sys-
tem "must reflect broad and deep attention to public issues.
3 5
Toward that end, "serious issues must be covered, and they must be
covered in a serious way."' 36 Second, "there must be public exposure to
an appropriate diversity of view."37 This means that "a broad spectrum
of opinion must be represented, [and] that people must be allowed to
hear sharply divergent views" on public affairs, including "challenges
to the conventional wisdom from a variety of different perspectives. 38
29. See infra Part I.A.
30. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28.
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 501 (2000).
32. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 18.
33. Id. at 20.
34. See id. at 21-22.
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 21-22.
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Sunstein cautions that " [i] n the absence of different perspectives and
a wide range of information, the system cannot function," because it
will "fail to expose errors of fact" and "fail to shed the kind of light
that comes only from diverse perspectives about public issues."
39
Others writing on this topic have sounded similar themes. R. Ran-
dall Rainey argues that "the media's power" should be "systematically
directed toward enriching public understanding, discussion, and de-
bate of important civic issues."'40 For Rainey, the focus of communica-
tions policy should be on "making available all relevant and material
information necessary for the formation of prudent judgments. 41
Owen M. Fiss likewise asserts that the purpose of free speech is to
"enrich public debate. '42 For Alexander Meiklejohn, the First Amend-
ment requires "that everything worth saying shall be said."43 Such are
the expectations deliberative democracy theorists place on the media.
Seeking to establish that his conception of a "well-functioning
democratic order" is grounded in the First Amendment, Sunstein
identifies three sources of authority. 44 First, he argues that James
Madison understood the importance of a free press in terms of its
contribution to deliberative democracy. For this proposition he cites
Madison's observation that the "value and efficacy" of the right of citi-
zens to elect members of their government "depends on the knowl-
edge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for the
public trust."45 Thus, Sunstein's "Madisonian" conception of the First
Amendment holds that the job of a free press is to enable citizens to
acquire the information necessary to deliberate on the merits of can-
didates for public office.46
Second, Sunstein points to the declaration by Justice Brandeis in
his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California47 that "[t]hose who
won our independence believed ... that the greatest menace to free-
dom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and
39. Id. at 22.
40. R. Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse. Democratic Govern-
ance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the Electronic
Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 333 (1993).
41. Id. at 331-32.
42. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1411 (1986).
43. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 26 (1948).
44. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 501.
45. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at xvii (quoting James Madison, Report of 1800
(Jan. 7, 1800)).
46. Id.
47. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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that this should be a fundamental principle of the American govern-
ment."48 From this Sunstein infers that the First Amendment should
be read to encourage deliberation among citizens on issues of public
concern .
4 9
Third, Sunstein cites Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,50 where the
Supreme Court declared: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount" under the First
Amendment.51 Rejecting the notion that the First Amendment exists
merely to defend owners of media outlets against government regula-
tion, the Court observed that " [i] t is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licen-
see." 52 For the Red Lion Court, the First Amendment preserves "the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences," not just the auton-
omy of private media owners.53
In sum, Sunstein concludes that the First Amendment as expli-
cated by Madison, Brandeis, and the Supreme Court in Red Lion "does
not stress the autonomy of broadcasters ... from regulation," but "is
based instead on the need to promote democratic self-government by
ensuring that people are presented with a broad diversity of views
about public issues."54 Thus, "legal rules designed to promote free-
dom of speech should not be invalidated" pursuant to a reflexive op-
position to government regulation of speech "if their purposes and
effects are constitutionally valid"55-that is, if their aim is to enhance
the quality of deliberative democracy by promoting discussion of pub-
lic issues from a broad diversity of perspectives. 56
B. Critique of the Public Deliberation Approach
Sunstein offers an insightful commentary on the state of public
deliberation in America and the media's limited contribution to delib-
48. Id. at 375; SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 26.
49. See SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 27-28.
50. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
51. Id. at 390.
52. See SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 49; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
53. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
54. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 49.
55. Id. at 37.
56. See id.
[Vol. 39
erative democracy. But his reading of the First Amendment has come
under substantial criticism, on three general grounds.
First, it is unclear how to determine the parameters of the "appro-
priate diversity" of viewpoints journalists should report.57 It would be
impractical-and undesirable-for journalists to report all viewpoints
on issues of public concern; a perusal of the World Wide Web reveals
that innumerable "viewpoints" exist, many of which do not warrant
much examination. As an abstract proposition, it is hard to disagree
with the assertion that "there must be public exposure to an appropri-
ate diversity of view"-or in Meiklejohn's formulation, to "everything
worth saying"5 8-but this is too vague a guidepost to inform journalis-
tic practice.59 Christopher S. Yoo points out that Sunstein's approach
"fail [s] to provide much guidance as to how to implement the systems
that [he] envision [s].'160 Indeed, most journalists would probably re-
tort that they do report an "appropriate" diversity of viewpoints. Sun-
stein's theory offers no clear basis for evaluating this claim. 61
Second, Sunstein's starting point-that ordinary citizens should
engage in "broad and deep" public policy deliberation, and that the
media should encourage them to do so-is easy to paint as unrealistic,
elitist, and/or paternalistic. J.M. Balkin suggests that Sunstein's call
for greater attention to public affairs "reflects his distrust of and disap-
pointment with American mass culture and the popular tastes re-
flected in that culture." 62 To Laurence H. Winer, Sunstein's work "has
the distinct and troubling paternalistic (not to mention elitist) flavor
of 'we' know best what speech is good for people and society and
57. Id. at 21; seeJ.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L.J. 1935, 1957 (1995) (reviewing CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1993)) (questioning the wisdom of leaving to government regulation
"[d]ecisions about what is 'worth saying'").
58. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 43, at 26.
59. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 21.
60. Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First
Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 326 (2003).
61. See Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and Beyond? Turner Broadcasting v.
FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 1, 38 (1997).
We used to have three, and now have four, vigorously competitive broadcast net-
works. Do they provide meaningfully diverse programming? Does a large cable
system with fifty or more active channels create a diverse marketplace of ideas, or
is there still basically nothing worthwhile to watch, only more channels on which
to watch it? How can we address such a question if the reason for asking it is not
just for the sake of social commentary, but to evaluate intrusive government regu-
lation in the face of the First Amendment?
Id.
62. Balkin, supra note 57, at 1955.
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therefore 'we' collectively can decide to ensure its availability."63
Whether or not it is fair or helpful to characterize the suggestion that
citizens should pay attention to public affairs as elitist or paternalistic,
an academic argument that presumes that people should watch less
NASCAR and more C-SPAN does invite such a response.
Third, it is not clear that Sunstein's conception of deliberative
democracy is derived from the First Amendment. Indeed, his "vision
of the First Amendment has ... proven to be quite controversial," as
"[f]ree speech theorists have long disputed the extent to which pro-
moting the democratic process constitutes the central value of the
First Amendment."64 Sunstein rests his claim to be advancing a
"Madisonian" conception of a well-functioning system of free expres-
sion not on any sustained argument found in Madison's seminal writ-
ings, but on a few sentences written by Madison in 1800,65 leading one
critic to declare that "Sunstein's 'Madisonian' theory of the First
Amendment is about as Madisonian as Madison, Wisconsin. '66
As for the Red Lion decision, Yoo observes that it has been charac-
terized as "something of a freak" in the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. 67 "Occasionally, the Supreme Court has flirted
[as in Red Lion] with the idea that the First Amendment protects the
right of the people to receive information rather than the right of
speakers to speak, but generally, the Court operates on the assump-
tion that the best way to protect everyone's right to receive informa-
tion is to protect everyone's right to speak."68 The Red Lion
interpretation of the First Amendment, on which Sunstein depends, is
therefore a questionable foundation on which to build a theory of the
role of a free press.
H. Independence of Government
If the Press Clause of the First Amendment has meaning beyond
the literal proscription of laws that directly abridge freedom of the
press, it might-as Sunstein suggests-establish the right of the public
to be exposed to a diverse spectrum of viewpoints for the purpose of
promoting public deliberation on issues of public concern. But it also
63. Winer, supra note 61, at 38 n.161.
64. Yoo, supra note 60, at 311.
65. SUNSrEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at xvii.
66. Balkin, supra note 57, at 1955; see also Yoo, supra note 60, at 319 ("A review of the
historical record reveals that this so-called 'Madisonian' vision of the First Amend-
ment ... is more Sunstein's creation than Madison's.").
67. Yoo, supra note 60, at 320.
68. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REv. 429, 525-26 (2002).
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means simply that the press should be independent of the
government.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that an indepen-
dent press is a central goal of the First Amendment. In Leathers v.
Medlock,6 9 the Court identified the crucial importance of "the press as
a watchdog of government activity."70 In Times-Picayune v. United
States,71 the Court noted the need for "[a] vigorous and dauntless
press" to "vigilantly scrutiniz[e] the official conduct of those who ad-
minister the state" and to act as "a potent check on arbitrary action or
abuse." 72 A free press is thus characterized not just by the absence of
direct government control-it is also expected to subject government
actions to independent critical scrutiny. 73
The Court has observed that it is a "basic assumption of our politi-
cal system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on
government. '74 In his concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v.
United States,75 Justice Black declared:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press
the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democ-
racy .... The Government's power to censor the press was abol-
ished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the
Government.... And paramount among the responsibilities of a
free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from
deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die
of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. 76
As Justice Stewart has put the point, "[i]f it is to perform its constitu-
tional mission, the press must do far more than merely print public
statements or publish prepared handouts." Otherwise, the press would
be reduced to the status of "a captive mouthpiece of 'newsmakers,"'
69. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
70. Id. at 447. On the watchdog ideal in general, see TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE
WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 3-7
(1990).
71. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
72. See id. at 602.
73. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667 (1990) (ob-
serving that the Court has "consistently recognized the unique role that the press plays
in ... offering criticism.... .") (emphasis added); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)
("the press serves and was designed to serve as'a powerful antidote to any abuses of power
by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials
elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.").
74. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
75. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
76. Id. at 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
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rather than an independent observer and critic. 77 Such are the Su-
preme Court's expectations of the press under the First Amendment.
All of this might seem uncontroversial, except for one problem: it
turns out that this is not how the press operates in practice. Although
the government cannot dictate the content of the news, it nevertheless
exerts an extraordinary degree of influence over the editorial deci-
sions journalists make.
A. The Insider Critique
Notwithstanding C. Edwin Baker's observation that "[o] ne of the
great attributes of [American] journalists is their almost religious in-
sistence on independence," 78 the experience of the Iraq War has
caused a number of leading journalists to acknowledge their lack of
independence in practice from the United States government. A case
in point are the comments (quoted in part above) ofJim Lehrer in an
interview with MSNBC's Chris Matthews. 79 Pressed to explain why the
media had not prepared the nation for the challenges a military occu-
pation of Iraq would pose, Lehrer indicated that this issue had not
been examined in the news during the prewar period because it had
not been a topic of discussion in official Washington:
the word occupation ... was never mentioned in the run-up to the
war. It was liberation. This was [talked about in Washington as] a
war of liberation, not a war of occupation. So as a consequence,
those of us in journalism never even looked at the issue of
occupation.80
Elaborating on this point, Lehrer observed that if journalists had
started looking into the "occupation" issue before the war started,
"[i] t would have been difficult to have had debates about [the occupa-
tion issue] going in, when the president and the government . . .
[were] not talking about occupation .... [Y] ou'd have had to have
gone against the grain."81 So for this member of our "vigorous and
dauntless press," it would be too much to expect journalists to have
"gone against the grain" by examining on their own initiative an issue
that was not on the Washington agenda.8 2
Other leading journalists have echoed Lehrer's observation. As
Washington Post columnist David Ignatius puts the point, journalists
77. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 729 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
78. BAKER, supra note 8, at 282.
79. Hardball with Chris Matthews: Interview with Jim Lehrer, supra note 5.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953).
[Vol. 39
have "rules of our game" that "make it hard for us to tee up an issue
... without a news peg."83 Pursuant to these rules, "if Senator so and
so hasn't criticized post-war planning for Iraq, then it's hard for a re-
porter to write a story about that."84 Instead, reporters "wait for some-
body [in Washington] to make a statement, and then . . report on
the statement. '" 8
5
Although this would seem to be a peculiar modus operandi for
professional journalists with an "almost religious insistence on inde-
pendence,' 8 6 the analysis advanced by Lehrer and Ignatius is sup-
ported by Pulitzer Prize-winning Associated Press reporter Charles J.
Hanley, author of a Fall 2003 story on the AP wire that detailed the
torture of Iraqis at Abu Ghraib months before a leaked United States
Army report and the now-famous digital photographs indisputably de-
picting abuse caused the story to "break" in the Spring of 2004. Asked
why his story was not picked up by major media outlets, 8 7 Hanley ex-
plained that the practice of the American media is to "invest[ ] U.S.
official statements with credibility while disregarding statements from
almost any other source," such as the Iraqi prisoners he had inter-
viewed.88 Editors declined to publish the story in the Fall of 2003 be-
cause at that time, there was "no official structure to the story. It was
not an officially sanctioned story that begins with a handout from an
official source.."8 9
In the judgment of John Burns of the New York Times, the press
"failed the American public by being insufficiently critical about ele-
ments of the administration's plan to go to war."90 The cause of this
failure is suggested by Bums' New York Times colleague Judith Miller,
author of a series of now-discredited stories about Iraq's purported
weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") in the period leading up to the
Iraq War. Responding to criticism that her reporting was too credu-
83. On the Media: Interview of David Ignatius (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 30, 2004), tran-
script available at http://www.wnyc.org/onthemedia/transcripts/transcripts.043004_me-
dia.html (last visited July 13, 2005).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. BAKER, supra note 8, at 282.
87. Greg Mitchell, Where Was Press when First Iraq Prison Issues Arose? EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, Apr. 2004, at 22, 22 (interviewing Charles J. Hanley).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Joey Coburn & Betty Yu, Journalists Spar over Media Coverage of War with Iraq, DAILY
CALIFORNIAN, Mar. 19, 2004, at Al; see also Paul Krugman, Triumph of the Trivia4 N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2004, at A15 (describing "the failure to raise questions about the rush to invade
Iraq" as a "serious ... journalistic betrayal").
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lous of White House claims about Iraq's alleged capabilities, Miller
declared: "My job isn't to assess the government's information and be
an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of
The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq's arse-
nal."91 So Miller just reported "what the government thought." The
truth or falsity of the government's position was evidently not her
concern.92
B. The Academic Critique
Academics who study the media have seen all of this before. In
his ground breaking work, The 'Uncensored War: The Media and Viet-
nam, Daniel C. Hallin refuted the proposition that the media played
an independent role in generating domestic opposition to the Viet-
nam War.93 Hallin found that sustained criticism of the United States
policy of military intervention in Vietnam did not emerge in the me-
dia until 1967, after critical views had been articulated in Congress
and inside the Johnson administration. 94 According to Hallin, it was
dissenting voices inside the American government that caused the me-
dia coverage to turn critical, not any independent critical impulse of
journalists. 95
The pattern of coverage Hallin described with respect to Vietnam
has been a recurring phenomenon. 96 When the United States invaded
Grenada in 1983, President Reagan explained that military action was
necessary because the small Caribbean island posed a national secur-
ity threat to the United States and because civil unrest in Grenada
91. Michael Massing, Iraq: Now They Tell Us, NY. REv. BooKs, Feb. 26, 2004, at 43.
92. It seems probable that American journalists would not be in the introspective
mode in which we encounterJim Lehrer and his colleagues if the invasion of Iraq, like the
Panama invasion and the Gulf War, had achieved its own stated objectives. The Iraq War,
however, has not achieved the Bush Administration's stated objectives of eliminating Iraq's
vast stockpiles of WMD (none were found) and breaking the ties between Iraq and al
Qaeda (none of any significance existed). Meanwhile, large numbers of Americans con-
tinue to be killed and injured. Journalists have thus come to reflect on their own contribu-
tion in getting us to this point.
93. DANIEL C. HALLIN, THE 'UNCENSORED WAR': THE MEDIA AND VIETNAM 3-4 (1986).
94. See id. at 159-174.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., HALLIN, supra note 93, at 213-14; JONATHAN MERMIN, DEBATING WAR AND
PEACE: MEDIA COVERAGE OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE POST-VIETNAM ERA 143 (1999); PIERS
ROBINSON, THE CNN EFFECT: THE MYTH OF NEws, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION 12
(2002); TAKEN By STORM: THE MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
GULF WAR chs. 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds., 1994); W.
Lance Bennett, Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States, 40J. COMM. 2,
103-125 (1990);John Zaller & Dennis Chui, Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Cover-
age of Foreign Policy Crisis, 1945-1991, 13 POL. COMM. (1996) at 385.
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endangered American medical students there.97 Because Democrats
in Congress questioned these White House claims, critical perspec-
tives on the decision to invade were reported.98 In contrast, when the
United States invaded Panama in 1989, claiming that Panama posed a
national security threat to the United States and citing the death of an
American at a Panamanian military roadblock, Democrats supported
President Bush.99 Although it seemed clear that Democratic support
for the invasion was to a great extent the product of a strategic maneu-
ver undertaken to counter the perception that the party of Jimmy
Carter, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis lacked fortitude on na-
tional security issues, the absence of Democratic opposition gave rise
to media coverage devoid of critical perspectives on the decision to
invade. 100
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and President Bush
countered by dispatching ground troops to Saudi Arabia and analogiz-
ing Iraq's action to Hitler's initial conquests, Democrats voiced sup-
port, and critical perspectives were marginalized in the media.10 1 The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, had
been opposed to the decision to dispatch ground troops before it was
made. Leading Democrats suggested in the few days after the Iraqi
invasion, but before the American decision to send ground troops to
the region was announced, that such a response would be unwar-
ranted. 10 2 When the White House acted, however, and Democrats (as
well as General Powell) declined to criticize its action, journalists
geared to official sources found themselves with no critical perspec-
tives to report.10 3
A few months later, in November 1990, when President Bush
made clear that he intended to launch an offensive military operation
to oust Iraq from Kuwait, Democrats voiced opposition to this course
97. See MERMIN, supra note 96, at 37-42, 45-47.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 37-42, 48-51.
100. See id. at 48-51, 53-56, 62-64. Journalists did offer some overheated speculation
in the first few days of the operation that the invasion might fail to achieve its own objec-
tives, but the discussion was premised on the assumption that military action had in fact
been necessary. See id.
101. See William A. Dorman & Steven Livingston, News and Historical Content: The Estab-
lishing Phase of the Persian Gulf Policy Debate, in TAKEN BY STOtm: THE MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION,
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GuLF WAR 63, 65 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz
eds., 1994); MERMIN, supra note 96, at 66-76.
102. See BOB WooDwARD, THE COMMANDERs 209-214 (1991); MERMIN, supra note 96, at
88-89.
103. See Dorman & Livingston, supra note 101, at 65; MERMIN, supra note 96, at 66-76.
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of action, and a period of critical media coverage ensued. 10 4 When the
war started, however, Democrats struck a supportive pose, and critical
perspectives were once again relegated to the margins of the news. 10 5
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that the spec-
trum of issues and perspectives reported in the news is a function of
the spectrum of debate inside the government.10 6 One recent work
concludes that "[a] n idea must usually have energetic sponsors among at
least a few powerful leaders to receive sympathetic attention" in major
media outlets.10 7 It is remarkable that our free and independent press
requires that an idea have the energetic sponsorship of powerful gov-
ernment officials for it to receive positive coverage in the news. As
Timothy E. Cook explains, Justice Stewart's "presumption that the
news media work to check government is simply empirically
wrong."10 8
Evidence that the media are not an effective check on the govern-
ment does not mean that journalists are mere propaganda instru-
ments of the President, for the simple reason that opposition party
politicians in Congress often criticize White House actions, and jour-
nalists report their criticism.10 9 But what is the relationship of the
104. See Robert M. Entman & Benjamin I. Page, The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War
Debate and the Limits of Media Independence, in TAKEN BY STORM: THE MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION,
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GuLF WAR 82, 84 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds.
1994); MERMIN, supra note 96, at 66-67, 93-96.
105. See MERMIN, supra note 96, at 107-14.
106. See supra note 96; see also ROBERT M. ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER: FRAMING
NEWS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 4-5 (2004) (noting that authors such as
Hallin, Bennett, and Mermin, whose work represents one of "two major approaches to
understanding the government-media nexus in foreign policy" (the other approach as-
cribes even less independence to the media), "convincingly emphasize... elite opposition
as a vital determinant of whether the news will deviate from the White House line," al-
though they do not "explain fully" certain aspects of media coverage of United States for-
eign policy). Journalists do report foreign criticism of United States military actions, even
when a consensus exists in Washington, but such criticism-for example, Iraqi denuncia-
tions of impending American "aggression" during the buildup to the Iraq War-tends to
be framed in terms that do not resonate with American audiences. See MERMIN, supra note
96, at 13.
107. ENTMAN, supra note 106, at 110 (emphasis added).
108. COOK, supra note 8, at 179.
109. Even where United States policy has bipartisan backing in Washington, journalists
may continue to articulate procedural criticism of the President, such as criticism of a Presi-
dent who has sent troops abroad for falling to consult with Congress or for limiting the
media's access to the action. See ENrMAN, supra note 106, at 79-84. Journalists also intro-
duce critical tension into the news, even in cases of bipartisan consensus in Washington, by
speculating as to the possibility that the President's policy might fall, on its own terms, to
achieve its own objectives, or by noting the political risks run by the president if the opera-
tion does not go as planned. See id. at 118-19; MERMIN, supra note 96, at 9. Nevertheless,
when there is bipartisan support in Washington for a White House action, critical perspec-
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press to the government as a whole? Ifjournalists use the spectrum of
debate inside the government to set the spectrum of debate :n the
news, is the press independent of the governmer.-.'in practice? Such
journalism is independent of the President, as it reports criticism of
the President's policies when criticism has been expressed in Con-
gress (or by other official actors). Congress, however, is a branch of
the government. Thus journalism that reports critical perspectives on
the President's policies only if they have first been articulated in Con-
gress cannot plausibly be described as being independent of the gov-
ernment. This creates First Amendment concerns.
C. The Iraq War
The contours of the media's independence problem have been
on display in connection with the Iraq War.' 10 When it emerged in
2002 that the Bush Administration was planning a "preemptive" attack
on Iraq, voices inside and outside of Washington, including many
Democrats and even some Republicans, expressed initial opposition
to the idea."' In the Summer of 2002, top officials who had served
under President George H.W. Bush criticized the impending march
toward war, and their views received extensive coverage." 2 Their criti-
cism was reflected in the news, which in the Summer of 2002 was full
of criticism of the emerging United States policy towards Iraq.113
In the Fall of 2002, however, the political dynamic changed. As
Republicans closed ranks behind President Bush and "resurrected the
cold war era charge that Democrats were 'soft on defense"' in time for
the congressional campaign, "most Democratic congressional leaders
voiced support for presidential authority to wage war against Iraq."1 4
Leading Democratic presidential candidates-including Senators
John Kerry and John Edwards and Representative Richard
tives on the wisdom and justification of the policy itself are ignored or marginalized in the
news. See id. at 9-10, 143.
110. See infta Section III.A.
111. See ENT'MAN, supra note 106, at 109-112.
112. Id. at 109; see also id. at 111 ("[E]lite source networks were buzzing with dissent in
the summer of 2002."). Id.; William A. Dorman, Stop Me Before I Shill Again: American Jour-
nalism and the Iraq War, 13 POL. COMM. RE'., Fall 2003, at 1, 1 ("such significant political
elites and heavyweights from the first Bush administration as Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence
Eagleburger, and General Anthony C. Zinni . . . raised serious questions [in mid-2002]
about the current President Bush's thinking [about Iraq].").
113. See ENru.N, supra note 106, at 111; Dorman, supra note 101, at 1.
114. ENTMAN, supra note 106, at 112.
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Gephardt-did likewise. 115 This seemed to reflect not so much ajudg-
ment on the merits by Democrats that the president's policy was
sound, but a political calculation that a Democrat who did not sup-
port the war could not be elected President." 6
Once the formal debate in Congress had concluded and the
White House had prevailed, critical perspectives faded to the margins
of Washington debate and thus were marginalized in the news too.1 1 7
In the crucial weeks before the war started, the media echoed the con-
cerns expressed by some Democrats that the President's timetable for
war seemed rather precipitous and that the opposition of France and
Germany was cause for concern.' 18 But because journalists declined to
cast their gaze beyond official Washington in search of critical per-
spectives, major media outlets made no real inquiry into the merits of
the policy of invading Iraq.' 1 9 So as best one could determine by read-
115. SeeJim Vandeltei, Past Votes Dog Some Presidential Candidates, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2003, at Al.
116. See ENrmAN, supra note 106, at 161 ("Many politicians seemed to feel they would
lose more votes (and contributions) from hawks by opposing the war than they would gain
from doves"); Dan Balz, Democratic Rivals' War Dilemma, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at Al
(analyzing the strategic calculations of Democratic Presidential candidates); Jennifer Bar-
rett, Where's the Dissent, NEWSWEEI.COM,Jan. 16, 2003, http://www.newsweek.com (archived
document requiring payment to access) (last visited July 24, 2005) (interview with W.
Lance Bennett) ("[T]he Democrats are in an extremely weak position at the moment and
they are unwilling to challenge [President Bush] even if they don't feel the war is a good
idea.").
117. See Er'rrMAN, supra note 106, at 111; W. Lance Bennett, Operation Perfect Storm: The
Press and the Iraq War, 13 POL. COMM. REP., Fall 2003, at 1, 1.
Apparently the defeated Democrats [in the November 2002 congressional elec-
tions] have been advised to offend no one and take no political risks .... News
organizations are so dependent on prominent official sources to advance chal-
lenges to a leading news frame that the strategic silence of the Democrats all but
killed media deliberation about the war.
118. See ENTMAN, supra note 106, at 155 (As the war approached, the "framing contest
[in the media] was restricted mostly to arguing over 'war soon' or 'work through the U.N.,'
not over the problem definition and causal analysis that pointed to disarming Iraq" as an
appropriate course of action).
119. See INGRID A. LEHMANN, EXPLORING THE TRANSATLANTIC MEDIA DIVIDE OVER IRAQ
31 (The Joan Shorenstein Ctr. on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy
Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 2004-1, 2004).
U.S. journalists accepted, for the most part, uncritically the slogans of the Bush
Administration, such as "Saddam the tyrant and madman" who was to be deposed
in the interest of freedom and human rights, linking Saddam Hussein to Al
Qaeda and the 9/11 terrorist attack, and arguing that Iraq's alleged weapons of
mass destruction posed a direct threat to the United States.
Murrey Marder, What Happens When Journalists Don't Probe?, NIEMAN REP., Summer 2003, at
73, 74.
The Bush [Administration's] new policy of preemptive military engagement
reached far beyond Iraq, and it was never seriously examined or debated in Con-
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ing the morning paper and watching the evening news, the essential
questions surrounding what was being billed as the "Battle of Iraq"
engagement in the "Global War on Terrorism" were simply ones of
alliance management and timing.120
Independent journalism guided by the First Amendment would
have "looked at the issue of occupation" in advance of the war even if
official Washington was not looking at it.1 21 An independent press
would have devoted more attention to opposition to the war among
foreign policy experts outside of Washington, such as the thirty-three
distinguished international relations professors who deemed it neces-
sary to place a paid advertisement in the New York Times in September
2002 declaring: "Even if we win easily, we have no plausible exit strat-
egy," but "would have to occupy and police [Iraq] for many years to
create a viable state."1 22 An independent press would not have waited
for "Senator so-and-so" to "tee up" the issue of what would happen
after the initial conquest of Iraq before focusing on this crucial
question. 123
Once the war started, critical perspectives in Washington-and
therefore in the news-were few and far between. 124 The coverage
gress. The press, also.., failed "to connect the dots," even though President Bush
called it a new "doctrine"-the lofty term reserved for historic pronouncements
such as the "Monroe Doctrine" and "Truman Doctrine."
Id.
120. As former New York Times columnist, Tom Wicker, wrote a week before the war
started: "Bush administration spokesmen have made several cases for waging war against
Iraq, and the U.S. press has tended to present all those cases to the public as if they were
gospel." Marder, supra note 119, at 75 (quoting Tom Wicker, Press Isn't Asking Right Ques-
tion About Iraq, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 11, 2003); see also Anthony Lewis, The Responsibili-
ties of a Free Press, NIEMAN REP., Summer 2004 at 60, 62. (noting "a press tendency to take its
lead from the White House... in the run-up to the Iraq War. Diligent digging would have
found the doubts that we now know existed in the intelligence agencies about the exis-
tence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. If the press had been more critical-more
independent-the public would not have been led so easily from al Qaeda to Iraq as the
enemy that 44 percent of respondent in a poll thought there were Iraqis among the air-
plane terrorists on September 11th.")
121. See Hardball with Chris Matthews: Interview with fim Lehrer, supra note 5.
122. War with Iraq Is Not in America's National Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A29
(paid political advertisement signed by over thirty leading international relations scholars).
123. See On the Media: Interview of David Ignatius, supra note 83.
124. See ENwrA, supra note 106, at 118 ("CNN's prime time news host, Aaron Brown,
said that the justifiability of the war was 'just not a relevant question' once it started.");
Bennett, supra note 117, at I (characterizing the Iraq war as "a national patriotic rally that
was led as much by a cheerleading press as by the administration"); Marder, supra note
109, at 75 (quoting BBC director-general Greg Dyke: "I was shocked while in the United
States by how unquestioning the broadcast news media was during the war."); Adam
Nagourney, Democrats Say Bush's Credibility Has Been Damaged, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at
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continued in this noncritical mode until the Summer of 2003, when
Democrats started remarking on the failure to locate weapons of mass
destruction and questioning the President's plan for reconstruc-
tion. 125 Journalists reported this, and the coverage became more
critical. 126
Even after support for the war started to unravel in Washington,
the critical perspectives featured in the news continued to be the ones
that were articulated in Washington; other notable points were not
emphasized. Like the Democrats, the media trumpeted the failure to
locate WMD in Iraq.127journalists neglected, however, a more instruc-
tive postwar WMD story. Although the White House had expressed
grave concern before the war that Iraq's WMD might come into the
possession of terrorists, and that al Qaeda was operating inside Iraq,
American forces demonstrated no particular interest in securing sus-
pected WMD sites in the chaotic period after the fall of Saddam Hus-
sein.1 28 If concern about WMD being given to al Qaeda had been
among the real reasons for the war, one might have expected the
American military not to have permitted the rampant looting of nu-
clear waste sites that transpired on their watch.129 An independent
press would have examined this issue and its implications, but with the
Democrats declining to take the lead, the story never got off the
ground.
An independent press would also have challenged the conflation
of chemical and biological weapons with nuclear weapons under the
"WMD" heading. 130 While hypothetical Iraqi nuclear weapons could
Al1 (noting that until the Summer of 2003 "most of the Democrats had been reluctant to
criticize a war that had appeared successful" and had public support).
125. See Nagourney, supra note 124, at All ("Democratic presidential candidates of-
fered a near-unified assault on President Bush's credibility in his handling of the Iraq war,
signaling a shift in the political winds by aggressively invoking arguments most had
shunned" up to this point).
126. See id.
127. See Barton Gellman, Fru-trated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq, WASH. POST, May 11,
2003, at Al.
128. See Rob Norland, WMDsfor the Taking?, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 2003, at 30, 30 (report-
ing the failure to secure suspected WMD sites).
129. See id.
130. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELLING: LOSING OUR WAY IN THE NEW CEN-
TURY 11 (2003) (noting the significant distinction between chemical weapons and nuclear
weapons); SUSAN D. MOELLER, MEDIA COVERAGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 41
(Ctr. for Int'l & Sec. Studies at Md., 2004), available at http://www.cissm.umd.edu/docu-
ments/WMDstudy full.pdf (the media's persistent "[c]onflating [of] nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons amorphously together as 'weapons of mass destruction' often was a
result ofjournalists keying off speeches and statements by President Bush," whose adminis-
tration "deliberate[ly] aggregat[ed]" these different categories of weapons) (last visited
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indeed have posed a real threat to the United States, Iraqi poison gas
and anthrax, even if such things had existed in 2003, simply would not
have warranted the same degree of concern.13' Indeed, Iraq's pur-
ported chemical weapons would have posed no greater danger to the
United States than a truck loaded with conventional explosives deto-
nated next to a chemical plant in an American city.1 32 White House
statements, however, blurred this crucial distinction between chemical
and biological weapons, which Iraq was believed to possess, and nu-
clear weapons, which Iraq was never even alleged to have obtained. 133
Democrats had their own reasons for not pointing this out, as any
suggestion that the White House was exaggerating the threat posed by
WMD would have played into the Republican strategy of painting
Democrats as soft on national security. Thus, the media, once again
taking their cues from Washington, failed to subject the Bush Admin-
istration's framing of the WMD issue to critical examination.13 4
Opponents of the war outside of Washington advanced a much
more sweeping critique than did the Democrats, arguing not (as the
Democrats argued) that the war was unjustified because Iraq turned
out not to have chemical and biological weapons, but that even if Iraq
had possessed such weapons, a United States attack would have been
neither warranted nor wise.13 5 Nevertheless, because the media were
indexing debate in the news to debate in Washington, the public re-
ceived extensive exposure to the view that the war may not have been
justified because the United States had failed to find WMD.13 6 The
view that a preemptive war based on Iraq's possession of chemical and
biological weapons, which it had neither the interest nor the means to
deploy to any real effect against the United States, was a bad idea,
even if such weapons had in fact existed-a much more profound in-
July 13, 2005); see also id. at 26 ("The U.S. media typically confirmed the Bush administra-
tion's political and diplomatic agenda-setting.... If the White House acted like a WMD
story was important, so too did the media. If the White House ignored a story (or an angle
on a story), the media was likely [to] as well.").




135. See War with Iraq is Not in America's National Interest, supra note 122; EntrmAN, supra
note 106, at 154-55 (noting that past United States administrations had been unconcerned
about Iraq's use of chemical weapons).
136. See Dana Priest & Walter Pincus, Bush Certainty on Iraq Arms Went Beyond Analysts'
View, WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at Al (reporting "a burgeoning controversy in Congress
and within the intelligence community over the U.S. rationale for going to war," and that
the failure to find WMD in Iraq was "fueling sentiment among some Democrats on Capitol
Hill .. .that the administration may have exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq").
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dictment of American policy-was marginalized in the prewar and
postwar coverage.
Robert M. Entman has pointed to the "need to root debates over
the First Amendment in the way that the media.., actually behave,
not in an abstracted ideal that neglects what scholars and practitioners
of journalism know about the real world. '13 7 As it turns out, how jour-
nalists actually behave is often flatly at odds with the role the First
Amendment has reserved for an independent press.
D. Official Sources
Why are journalists so reliant on official sources to establish the
terms and boundaries of foreign policy debate in the news? Sociolo-
gists who have observed the operation of news organizations describe
a powerful structural bias toward covering events from the perspective
of government officials. 138 In practical terms, what journalists need
are "predictably available raw materials that can be assembled [into
news stories] . . . in a routine fashion."1 39 As Herbert J. Gans has ex-
plained, the sources that best meet the requirements of news organi-
zations are high-ranking government officials, who "have the power
and staffs to create newsworthy events (ranging from decisions and
activities to ceremonies) or statements (including reports, speeches,
and news conferences. .. ) regularly and quickly."1 40 This explains the
tendency of journalists to cluster around top government officials.141
Because "It]he government is organized to provide a timely flow
of information, geared to the demands of daily journalism[,] it is ex-
tremely efficient for news organizations to locate their personnel at
the channels provided by the government." 142 Rather than spend
money investigating potential stories on their own, journalists geared
to official sources need simply to show up at their appointed beat and
receive the daily offering. 143 "When officials create newsworthy events
137. Robert M. Entman, Putting the First Amendment in its Place: Enhancing American De-
mocracy Through the Press, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 61, 80 (1993).
138. The classic study is HERBERTJ. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS (1980). See also MARK
FISHMAN, MANUFACTURING THE NEWS 143 (1980); Gaye Tuchman, Objectivity as Strategic Rit-
ual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity, 77 AM. J. Soc. 676 (1972).
139. HERBERTJ. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 50 (2003).
140. Id. at 50; see also BAKER, supra note 8, at 196 (noting the economic pressure on
media entities to "abandon expensive, investigative reporting and replace it with cheaper,
routine beat reporting").
141. See id.
142. HALLiN, supra note 93, at 71; see also ENrrMAN, supra note 106, at 92.
143. GANS, supra note 139, at 51.
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or statements, they... reduce costs for the news media."144 Indeed,
the government operations designed to supply the media with the raw
materials out of which to construct news stories are so extensive that
one commentator has described the "public relations infrastructure"
of the United States government as a form of "subsidy" to the news
media.145
The second great virtue of official sources is their presumptive
credibility. 146 To say that government officials are "credible" news
sources does not mean that whatever they say is necessarily deemed to
be true. Rather, government officials are credible in the sense that if a
journalist reports a statement by a government official that proves to
be inaccurate, it is the official-not the journalist-who receives the
blame.1 47 Since government officials are presumptively credible, it is
always safe for journalists to report what they say.148 Journalists place
themselves at greater risk by citing sources who are not per se "news-
worthy," since a journalist who cites a non-official source whose infor-
mation proves to be false may be held to have exercised poor
judgment if the story generates controversy.149 The prima facie credi-
bility of official sources thus works in tandem with their low cost to
create a powerful set of incentives encouraging their use and discour-
aging investigative reporting based on non-official sources.1 50 The
point is not that mainstream journalists never do investigative report-
ing based on nonofficial sources, but that the vast majority of their
coverage is based on what government officials tell them.
144. Id. at 51.
145. CooK, supra note 8, at 44.
146. GANS, supra note 139, at 50-51.
147. See COOK, supra note 8, at 92 ("reporters constantly gravitate toward 'persons in a
position to know,' whereby they may then defend themselves from potential criticism
against giving airtime or print space to someone who did not deserve it."); ROBERT W.
MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES
49 (1999) ("To avoid the controversy associated with determining what is a legitimate news
story, professional journalism relies upon official sources as the basis for stories.").
148. See COOK supra note 8, at 92.
149. Id.
150. To be precise, many news sources are not current government officials, but in-
stead are former government officials or inside-the-beltway experts affiliated with Washing-
ton think tanks or other institutions with close ties to the government. These sources offer
the same basic cost and credibility advantages as incumbent government officials. When
there is a bipartisan consensus inside the government, former government officials and
Washington think tank experts tend to reflect that consensus, rather than offer an inde-
pendent perspective. SeeJAMEs A. SMITH, THE IDEA BROKERS: THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF
THE NEW POLICY ELITE 213 (1991) (The aim of Washington think tanks is to "define the
middle ground and provid[e] an environment in which the knowledge of experts can be
channeled to serve political ends.").
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A comment by a former editorial page editor of USA Today, Paul
McMasters, reveals the extent to which journalists associate "news"
with official sources. McMasters observes that journalists are in no po-
sition to resist White House "news management" techniques because
"Federal officials, after all, have whatjournalists need: the news."151 In
other words, as defined by American journalists, "the news" is what
government official say.152 Again, because government officials are
often in disagreement, news derived from official sources may be
quite critical of United States policy.15 3 Most critical reporting, how-
ever, is a function of the range of perspectives expressed by official
sources, not the product of independent journalistic initiative. 154
The idea that reporting the news from the vantage point of
elected officials constitutes "objective" journalism-so long as the cov-
erage is "balance d]" as between official factions-was established
early in the 20th Century. 155 The objectivity ideal emerged as large
corporate news organizations replaced the smaller and more varied
press of the 19th Century:
Modern news organizations clearly possess enormous power: they
control the society's major channels of political communication.
Yet they are privately owned and have virtually no direct accounta-
bility either to the public or to formally constituted political au-
thority; as the phrase goes, "Nobody elected the press." The
professionalization of journalism allows both the corporation and
the journalist to respond to criticisms of their power with the claim
that they have in effect placed it in "blind trust" to the principles of
objective reporting. 156
The professional technique of "objective journalism"-defined to
mean balanced reporting of contending official perspectives-thus
made it possible for reporters to answer concerns about the large scale
and potential power of their news organizations with assurances that
journalism was a profession, whose practitioners could be trusted not
to shade or distort the news to serve private or partisan interests. 157
Indeed, most major American news organizations do seem to offer
reasonably balanced coverage of Democratic and Republican posi-
tions. But how does journalism that reports "both sides" of the issue-
151. Paul McMasters, Blurring the Line Between Journalist and Publicist, NIEMAN REP., Sum-
mer 2003 at 70, 70.
152. Id.
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. See id.
155. HALLIN, supra note 93, at 68.
156. Id. at 67.
157. See id. at 63-70.
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that is, the Democratic and Republican sides-measure up against the
First Amendment ideal of a press independent of government?
E. The First Amendment Ideal
The significance of an independent press is most often explained
in terms of the watchdog metaphor, with the reason for indepen-
dence being to permit journalists to expose corruption and the abuse
of government power. 158 In one of the earliest references to the need
for an independent press, the Continental Congress explained that
freedom of the press was necessary so that "oppressive officers are shamed
or intimidated[ ] into more honorable and just modes of conducting
affairs." 15 9 According to the Alexandria Virginia Gazette ofJanuary 14,
1790, a free press must sound "the alarm" in the event that "any man
or body of men dare to form a system against our interests . , "160 In
Sheppard v. Maxwell,16 1 the Supreme Court declared that the press
"guards against the miscarriage of justice" by subjecting official ac-
tions to "extensive public scrutiny."'162 The Court expressed the same
sentiment in Near v. Minnesota,163 noting the "primary need of a vigi-
lant and courageous press" to expose "malfeasance and corruption" in
government. 64
Academic commentators too have framed the case for an inde-
pendent press in terms of exposing abuse and corruption. Vincent
Blasi writes in an influential article that "one of the most important
values attributed to a free press by eighteenth-century political think-
ers was that of checking the inherent tendency of government officials
158. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 133, 166, 169.
159. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 463-64
(1983) (emphasis added).
160. LEONARD W. LEW, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss 291 (1985); see also Laurence B.
Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal for Limiting the Newsgathering
Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 97, 106 (2002).
The checking-value theory [of the First Amendment] is grounded in political
thought that addresses the tendency of officials to abuse the public trust ...
[T]he colonial pamphleteers organized much of their political thought around
the need they perceived to check the abuse of governmental power. The First
Amendment was an outgrowth of this body of thought.
Id. (emphasis added).
161. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
162. Id. at 350.
163. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
164. Id. at 719-20.
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to abuse the power entrusted to them." 165 Lee Bollinger likewise de-
clares that the "central image" of a free press under the First Amend-
ment posits the press as "the public's representative, its agent, helping
stand guard against the atavistic tendencies of the state" towards au-
thoritarianism. 166 For Lucas A. Powe, the "checking theory" of the
First Amendment "is bottomed in neither truth nor rationality, but
rather in distrust. It assumes a darker side of human nature and holds
that those who wield governmental power will be prone to overreach-
ing, and thus that it is essential to provide information for a resisting
citizenry."1 67
The premise behind these explanations of why democracy re-
quires an independent press is that the evil to be prevented is corrup-
tion or abuse of public power. It would seem that modern American
journalists have the same understanding of the significance of an in-
dependent press, as evidenced by the enormous volume of coverage
devoted to "scandals" (such as the Clinton-Lewinsky affair) in which
the President is accused not of making poor policy decisions, but of
unethical or unlawful conduct. 168 Democracy, however, needs an in-
dependent press not simply to expose corruption and wrongdoing in
the halls of power. In Justice Stewart's influential formulation, the
Press Clause is best understood as a "structural provision" of the Con-
stitution, designed "to create a fourth institution outside the Govern-
ment as an additional check on the three official branches."'1 69 The
argument here is that the "structural" significance of an independent
press goes beyond the need to expose official corruption and abuse of
power, encompassing also the job of revealing government policies
that are simply wrongheaded or misguided.' 70
There is support for this position in the founding period. Leo-
nard W. Levy writes that to the founders, "Freedom of the press ...
meant that the press had achieved a special status as an unofficial
fourth branch of government, 'the Fourth Estate,' whose function was
to check the three official branches by exposing misdeeds and policies
165. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Themry, 1977 Am. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 521, 538 (emphasis added).
166. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 20 (1991); see also Floyd Abrams, The
Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563,
591 (1979) (The press "serves as a vigilant protector of the public from its government.").
167. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 238 (1991).
168. On the media's obsession with scandal, see LARRvJ. SABATO ET AL., PEEP SHOW:
MEDIA AND POLITICS IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL (2000).
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contrary to the public interest."171 Levy points to the "representative
view[ ] ," published in the May 14, 1792 issue of the National Gazette of
Philadelphia, that the role of the press was to "'estimate justly the wis-
dom of leading measures of administration.'",172
It is clear that corruption and abuse of power have the capacity to
mislead citizens about issues of public concern. So, however, does the
ordinary working of a democratic government, a phenomenon that is
easy to recognize and is often remarked upon in commentary on
American politics, but that has significant implications for the "struc-
tural" role of an independent press that are less often noted.1 73 Al-
though the expression "politics stops at the water's edge" exaggerates
the degree to which American politicians are united on foreign policy,
there often is bipartisan support for United States foreign policy in
Washington, or at least for key premises on which it rests. History
reveals, however, that the Washington consensus is sometimes wrong.
A notable example is the consensus that prevailed in Washington dur-
ing the early years of the Vietnam War, holding that the United States
was fighting "Communist aggression" in Vietnam, rather than an in-
digenous revolutionary movement that would prove impossible to de-
feat.174 A more recent instance would seem to be the consensus in
Washington that Iraq posed a menacing threat to American national
security.175
Based on the Supreme Court pronouncements cited herein, one
might expect that if there were a consensus in Washington supporting
a certain point of view, but voices outside of Washington questioned
that point of view, an independent press would report the ques-
tions.176 In so doing, the press would be fulfilling its structural role in
the constitutional regime as a check on government power no less
than it does when it reveals official corruption and malfeasance. 177
171. See LEVY, supra note 160, at xii (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 291 ("Measures and not men are the proper subjects of cognizance to a free
press." (quoting VA. GAzETrTE & WINCHESTER ADVERTISER (Jan. 5, 1791))) (emphasis
added).
173. Stewart, supra note 169, at 633.
174. See HALLIN, supra note 93, at 24-25.
175. See Dana Priest & Dafna Linzer, Panel Condemns Iraq Prewar Intelligence, WASH. POST,
July 10, 2004, at A01 (reporting the conclusion of a Senate Committee that "[t]he U.S.
intelligence community gave lawmakers debating whether to wage war on Iraq a deeply
flawed and exaggerated assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction"); see
also infra Part III.C.
176. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 158-167 and accompanying text.
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It is true that no one elected the press. So maybe it is appropriate
for journalists to defer to government officials-who were elected to
office, or appointed by those who were elected-in setting the spec-
trum of debate in the news.178 This argument might have some force
if Washington debate could be understood as a merit-based delibera-
tive process in which plausible ideas received consideration and im-
plausible ones did not. But instead of indicating that elected officials
have weighed the pros and cons of policy options and reached a unan-
imous verdict on the merits, a Washington consensus on foreign pol-
icy may reflect nothing more than a political calculation by opposition
party politicians that supporting the President is a sound electoral
strategy, whatever the merits might be.179 Democratic backing of the
Iraq War, as noted above, would seem to be an example of this
phenomenon. 180
Notwithstanding the pervasive commentary of politicians and
pundits about the need for "principled leadership," building coali-
tions to win elections is precisely what politicians are supposed to be
doing. 181 We expect politicians to emphasize differences between the
parties on certain issues and to blur the differences on others, based
on strategic calculations of electoral advantage. 18 2 But it is contrary to
the First Amendment ideal for the press to let the strategic calcula-
tions of politicians determine the terms and boundaries of policy de-
bate in the news. For it may be that good reasons exist for criticizing
White House actions that the opposition party has decided, simply for
strategic reasons, not to articulate. An independent press should re-
port such criticism of United States policy as may be found outside of
Washington, notwithstanding the strategic silence of opposition party
178. SeeJohn Zaller, Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War, in
TAKEN By STORM: THE MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GULF WAR
186, 202 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds., 1994).
179. See RICHARD A. BRODY, ASSESSING THE PRESIDENT: THE MEDIA, ELITE OPINION, AND
PUBLIC SUPPORT 66 (1991) (In times of foreign crisis, "political figures from whom we
would normally expect negative comment on presidential performance will [often] instead
be silent or supportive."); Zaller, supra note 178, at 260 ("Members of Congress are deeply
strategic players whose visible actions often obscure their real intent.").
180. See infra Part III.C.
181. On the strategic nature of politics, see ANTHONY DOwNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974);
WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 66-71 (1960).
182. See PATTERSON, supra note 15, at 241. ("To criticize politicians for 'playing politics'
is to fault a process that is necessary to reconcile society's competing interests.").
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politicians, and should not marginalize perspectives simply because
they are not featured in Washington debate.18 3
It is therefore no defense, when consensus in official Washington
results in non-critical media coverage, for journalists to blame politi-
cians for not speaking up. As a former chief diplomatic correspondent
for the Washington Post has observed: "When a President hornswog-
gles, or bamboozles [the media,] the greatest default rests with those
being misled for their failure to fulfill their obligation to the public
interest as counterweights in the American system." 18 4 In other words,
journalists and politicians have different "structural" roles in a demo-
cratic system, and the Framers could not have envisioned that one
institution would permit the other to set its agenda and call its
tune.18 5 The job of politicians is to figure out how to win elections,
which may entail blurring differences between the parties and keep-
ing under wraps what would otherwise be significant substantive dis-
putes.18 6 The job of journalists, pursuant to our First Amendment
tradition, is to report the news from a vantage point independent of
the government, that is, "to check the three official branches by ex-
posing misdeeds and policies [that may be] contrary to the public inter-
est."' 8 7 If journalists do not examine the merits of government
policies, except to report such criticism as actors inside the govern-
ment have themselves first advanced, then we do not, in a crucial
sense, have an independent press.
Few would dispute that a press that simply reported whatever the
President and his subordinates in the executive branch said, and ig-
nored the position of the opposition party, would not be an indepen-
dent press and would not serve the needs of a democratic system.
Independence is not achieved, however, simply by expanding the pool
of sources with agenda-setting power to include the Congress, because
Congress itself is a branch of the government, and its members are
government officials.188 Rather than offering an independent per-
spective on the actions of the government, members of Congress are
the government; Congress does not constitute an independent van-
tage point from which to report on government policy.189
183. See id.
184. Marder, supra note 119, at 74.
185. See Stewart, supra note 169, at 633-34.
186. See supra notes 179, 182.
187. See LEVY, supra note 160, at xii (emphasis added).
188. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
189. See id.
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Of course, Democrats in Congress are free to criticize the actions
of a Republican President, and do so at times with great force. Jour-
nalists report their criticism. But what the Democrats decide to say-
and not to say-is a function of calculations of perceived advantage in
the political game, which in recent years have led Democrats to sup-
port Republican military interventions for reasons that often seem to
be independent of any assessment of the merits. 190 This means that
Democratic support for a Republican military intervention is not com-
pelling evidence that the policy advances American interests, or even
that a broad spectrum of elected officials believe that it does. It may
simply be that reelection-seeking Democrats have made a strategic de-
cision not to criticize an American war. 191
Certain media critics fault journalists for their deferential report-
ing of official pronouncements on the ground that the United States
is not a genuine or well-functioning democracy, and its government
does not represent the interests and opinions of ordinary citizens. 19 2
The argument here, in contrast, does not posit any particular view of
how democratic or representative the United States government is.
Instead, it rests on a phenomenon-politicians are strategic actors
who emphasize certain issues and perspectives and ignore others for
calculated political reasons-that may be observed in any democracy.
This phenomenon must be reckoned with in determining what is re-
quired of an independent press.
HI. Policy Implications
This Part identifies three significant advantages of the indepen-
dence of government approach to the media and the First Amend-
ment over the public deliberation approach as a basis for upholding
the constitutionality of policies aimed at improving the quality of me-
dia coverage of public affairs and outlines some policy initiatives that
would encourage more independent journalism.
190. See infra Part III.B.
191. See supra notes 179, 182.
192. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 112-113 (2004); EDWARD S.
HERMAN & NoAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
MASS MEDIA 298 (1988) (arguing that the function of the American news media is "to
inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that
dominate the domestic society and the state"); MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 50, 281.
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A. Advantages of the Independence of Government Approach
Notwithstanding their differences, the two approaches to the me-
dia and the First Amendment described in this Article are based on
the same basic concern: too narrow a spectrum of viewpoints is re-
ported in the news. The public deliberation approach posits that the
objective of the First Amendment is to promote active and informed
public debate and faults the media for failing to report a sufficiently
diverse spectrum of viewpoints on issues of public concern. 193 The in-
dependence of government approach concurs in the view that an in-
adequate spectrum of perspectives is reported, but offers a simpler
and more concrete account of the dimensions of the problem and the
appropriate remedy.194 There are three notable advantages of the in-
dependence of government framework.
First, in contrast to Sunstein's sensible but prescriptively un-
helpful call for journalists to report an "appropriate diversity" of view-
points, 195 the independence of government approach argues that
journalists fail to adhere to First Amendment principles when their
reporting is limited to viewpoints that have been expressed inside the
government. The solution to the independence problem is straight-
forward: do not select sources based on their ties to official Washing-
ton. Experts on United States foreign policy and world affairs may be
found at colleges and universities around the nation to explain and
interpret unfolding events from a vantage point independent of the
government.19 6 Representatives of organizations of engaged citizens
are also available to aid journalists in covering American foreign pol-
icy from a perspective independent of Democratic-Republican de-
bate.1 97 Independent academics and engaged citizens, as a rule, are
much less inclined than Washington insiders to follow the lead of poli-
ticians who may have closed ranks behind a presidential foreign policy
initiative simply for strategic political reasons.19 8 It is notable that Sun-
stein's aspiration that the media report "a broad spectrum of opinion"
that includes "sharply divergent views," and "not merely the conven-
tional wisdom and the reasons that can be offered on its behalf,"1 99
would be greatly advanced if journalists simply made a practice of
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. See supra Part III.
195. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 21.
196. MERMIN, supra note 96, at 28-32.
197. See id. at 32-35.
198. See id. at 30-33.
199. SUNSTEIN, DPFS, supra note 28, at 21-22.
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looking outside of Washington for sources of information and
analysis.
A second advantage of the independence of government ap-
proach is that it squares with traditional understandings of the First
Amendment. As indicated supra, the claim that the First Amendment
seeks to promote public deliberation has not won general accept-
ance. 200 The virtue of the independence of government approach is
that it is based on an ideal-a press independent of government-
that lies at the heart of our First Amendment tradition.20 1 While the
proposition that the First Amendment envisions a deliberative democ-
racy in which citizens pay broad and deep attention to public affairs is
debatable, it is beyond dispute that the First Amendment aims to pro-
mote an independent press.20 2 Since the independence of govern-
ment framework has deeper First Amendment roots, and increased
independence of Washington debate would be a simple and effective
way for journalists to expand the diversity of perspectives in the news,
proponents of the public deliberation approach should have reason
to embrace the independence of government framework.
A third advantage of the independence of government approach
as a justification for policies aimed at improving the quality of media
coverage of public affairs is that its express aim is to reduce the influ-
ence of the government over media content. The obvious concern
with public policies intended to influence the media is that the gov-
ernment's true objective may be to assert control over the press to
enhance its own power. 203 What is suggested here, however, is the
need to encourage journalists to be less influenced by the govern-
ment. This explicit objective of increasing the independence of the
press from the government should lessen the concern that would oth-
erwise exist that the government, in setting media policy, might simply
be seeking to expand its power and influence over the press. In con-
trast, policy initiatives aimed at promoting public deliberation are sus-
ceptible to the interpretation that the desired "deliberative" process is
one that leads the public to endorse the government's own posi-
tion.204 Policies designed to increase the independence of the press
from the government may be the one class of policies that do not give
rise to this concern.
200. See supra Part II.B.
201. See supra Part III.
202. See id.
203. See PowE, supra note 167, at 289-98.
204. See id.
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B. Encouraging Independent Journalism
The question of what to do about inadequate public affairs cover-
age is often simply brushed aside because the First Amendment is
deemed to preclude any policy response to the problem. 205 But "[i]f
the media in its natural state is not a responsible, serious and depend-
able watchdog of government, then adherence to a fourth estate ratio-
nale for a constitutional protection for free speech would likely lead
to a mandate for more rather than less legal regulation of media activ-
ities."20 6 As Alexander Meiklejohn observed in an influential work:
"Congress is not debarred [by the First Amendment] from all action
upon freedom of speech. Legislation which abridges that freedom is
forbidden, but not legislation to enlarge and enrich it."207 First
Amendment values are enlarged and enriched by measures that en-
courage the press to be independent of the government. So how
might this objective be advanced? This subpart sketches in broad
strokes a few steps that would address the problem identified in this
Article, along with many of the concerns expressed by Sunstein.
The past twenty years have seen a "dramatic reduction in legal
restrictions on ownership concentration" in the media, and a concom-
itant consolidation of media ownership in an increasingly small num-
ber of corporations. 20 8 This movement crested in 2003 when the FCC
drafted new regulations that would have significantly increased the
number of media outlets one corporation could own. 20 9 Since the reg-
ulations were announced, however, they have been opposed by
"smaller broadcasters and a coalition of labor, consumer, religious,
205. See SUNSTEIN, DPFS supra note 28, at 5 (describing "First Amendment absolutism"
as holding that "[ a] ny effort to regulate speech. . . threatens the principle of free expres-
sion.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Main R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After September 11th:
The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 202
(2002). See also CooK, supra note 8, at 182.
Congress is only prevented from making a law that abridges freedom of the press.
The Bill of Rights does not advocate a "hands-off" governmental position vis-a-vis
the news media. Indeed, legislation that facilitates or enhances freedom of the
press would presumably not only be permitted but warranted by the First
Amendment.
Id.
207. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 43, at 19. See also BAKER, supra note 8, at 213 ("[T]he press
Clause should be read to allow the government to promote a press that, in its best judg-
ment, democracy needs but that the market fails to provide.").
208. C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REv. 839,
841 (2002); BAGDIKIAN, supra note 192, at 27 (describing the dramatic increase in consoli-
dation of media ownership between 1983 and 2003).
209. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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artistic and civil rights organizations. '" 2 10 The House and Senate have
voted to overturn the new rules, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has struck them down.2 11 In this political
environment, it does not seem unrealistic to imagine the success of
policy initiatives aimed at reducing the concentration of media owner-
ship and encouraging the proliferation of smaller media outlets.
The existence of more (and more varied) media entities should
result in more independent journalism.2 12 As Baker points out,
"[d]ispersal [of media ownership] can support performance of the
'checking function' or watchdog role" because "it is plausible to ex-
pect that a larger number of competing 'watchdogs,' each of which
competes to discover abuse, will better perform this role than would
only a few." 213 In other words, "greater ownership pluralism will likely
increase the angles pursued by these media watchdogs." 21 4 Although
Baker advances the conventional formulation of the checking func-
tion or watchdog role as being necessary to reveal "abuse" in govern-
ment, rather than flawed policies, his general point is on the mark:
the greater the number of news outlets, the better the odds of critical
perspectives being reported. 215 'Just as divided political power fosters
accountability-a central tenet of federalism-so too, divided media
power fosters accountability. '" 2 16
210. Stephen Labaton, Court Orders F. C.C. to Rethink New Rules on Growth of Media, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2004, at Al.
211. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 372 (striking down the FCC's relaxation of
restrictions on consolidated media ownership); Stephen Labaton, F. C. C. Plan to Ease Curbs
on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at Al; Christopher Stern &
Jonathan Krim, House Votes to Prevent Change in Media Rule, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at Al.
212. The sociological account of news production (see supra Part III.D.) might suggest
that it makes no difference who owns the media, since the need for inexpensive and pre-
sumptively credible news sources would exist under any ownership regime. See Baker, supra
note 196, at 900. But there is reason to believe that policy initiatives geared toward reduc-
ing the concentration of media ownership would tend to encourage more independent
journalism, even if certain structural incentives of news production remained in place.
213. Baker, supra note 208, at 906.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. RonaldJ. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Me-
dia Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. Rev. 813, 868. See also
BOLLINGER, supra note 166, at 27.
The value the First Amendment places on many speakers is not based on a pre-
mise that more speakers results in less bias in any one, rather it is assumed that
more speakers means more people who have a self-interest in correcting the bi-
ases of others, despite the fact that they are biased themselves.
Id.; MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 306 (proposing "a pluralistic system [of public broad-
casting], with national networks, local stations, community and public access stations, all
controlled independently").
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Less concentrated ownership should also mean more news orga-
nizations that are less focused on the bottom line. Major public corpo-
rations-which own most of the leading United States media outlets-
are required to maximize shareholder profits, which may come at the
expense of other objectives that news organizations owned by smaller
entities might elect to pursue. As Baker explains:
When a paper or other media entity is profitable but could be
made more profitable by cutting the newsroom budget, the public
interest in quality media is served by having owners (or editors)
who would make the first choice. Society benefits by owners' will-
ingness to exercise "social responsibility" or otherwise emphasize
journalistic or creative quality rather than merely maximize the
bottom line.217
Although "legally mandating social responsibility is inconsistent with a
free press," it is appropriate for the law to recognize "the impact of
legal structural regulation of ownership on the likelihood of produc-
ing or undermining more responsible ownership" of the news
media."218
Translating these observations into the framework of this Article,
one form of "responsible"journalism that seems to be more prevalent
under non-corporate ownership is journalism that examines govern-
ment policy from a perspective independent of the government. It is
instructive that independent-minded journals such as the Nation and
the National Review are not subsidiaries of large corporations. Nor are
they noted for their profitability; they seem to exist for reasons other
than to maximize the income of their owners. This supports the hy-
pothesis that policies aimed at reducing the concentration of media
ownership in large profit-maximizing corporations-the opposite of
the direction in which the FCC has been moving-would encourage
independent journalism. Potential policy initiatives to foster a more
independent press therefore include tightening the limits on the
number of media entities one corporation is permitted to own, and
tax breaks or subsidies designed to aid smaller, non-corporate and/or
nonprofit media that could be expected to focus less on the bottom
line and more on practicing the craft and profession ofjournalism. 219
A related problem with concentrated corporate media ownership
is that large corporations tend to be risk averse. As explained supra,
217. Baker, supra note 208, at 903-04.
218. Id. at 904.
219. See CooK, supra note 8, at 188; MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 305. Cook observes
that media subsidies have existed throughout the course of American history. See COOK,
supra note 8, at 38-60. Such subsidies do not need to be invented, but rather expanded
and better targeted to foster smaller media entities.
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the path of least resistance for a news organization is simply to report
what government officials say, rather than seek to introduce non-offi-
cial perspectives that may clash with a Washington consensus and cre-
ate controversy.220 But smaller media entities under non-corporate
ownership should be less concerned with the potential controversy
generated by stories based on non-official sources who challenge the
prevailing wisdom in Washington. 221 "When a media entity is part of a
conglomerate in multiple lines of business, either governmental or
powerful private groups may find themselves both able and willing to
put serious economic pressure on one portion of the conglomerate in
order to induce the media entity to mute critical reporting."222 In con-
trast, a media entity that is not embedded in a major corporation
should be less fearful of giving offense-indeed it might welcome a
degree of notoriety-and should therefore be more inclined to exer-
cise its First Amendment right to criticize the government, undeterred
by a Washington consensus. Again, policies aimed at fostering smaller,
non-corporate media are indicated.
A further potential response to the independence problem is
based on evidence that advertiser-supported media have incentives to
avoid controversial stories that might offend major advertisers.2 23 Just
as large corporate media with mass audiences for their journalistic
and other product lines may prefer to avoid association with contro-
versial out-of-the-mainstream political views, any media outlet that re-
lies on advertising for its revenue must concern itself with the
potential reaction of its advertisers to stories that fly in the face of a
Washington consensus. 224 Initiatives such as a tax on advertising, with
the proceeds used to subsidize media that would not depend on ad-
vertising revenue, would encourage independentjournalism to the ex-
tent that media less concerned about potential advertiser reaction
should be less hesitant to feature voices that question the prevailing
wisdom and the status quo in Washington.2 25
It is not unrealistic to expect that American politicians, who never
miss a chance to expound upon the virtues of small businesses, could
take a few steps to help small media businesses. Of course, increased
220. See supra Part II.D.
221. See Baker, supra note 208, at 908.
222. Id. ("The greatest policy fear, of course, is that the mere vulnerability will influ-
ence initial journalistic decisions-a form of self-censorship-or prevent them from seeing
the light of day.").
223. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PREss 56-58 (1994).
224. See id.
225. See COOK, supra note 8, at 188.
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restrictions on concentrated corporate media ownership and incen-
tives designed to favor smaller non-corporate media would be certain
to elicit First Amendment challenges from media owners. One re-
sponse (Sunstein's) would be that the First Amendment is concerned
not just with the right of media owners to unfettered control of their
private property, but also with seeing that citizens are exposed to a
rich diversity of perspectives on issues of public concern.226 A second
response is that the point of the First Amendment is to ensure that the
press remains independent of the government, and that if the press
proves not to be independent of government in practice, policy initia-
tives aimed at increasing its independence should pass constitutional
muster. Greater limitations on concentrated corporate ownership of
media entities and tax incentives and subsidies aimed at encouraging
smaller and/or less advertising-dependent media could help to create
a media system in which the First Amendment ideal of a press inde-
pendent of government described not just the legal rights and demo-
cratic aspirations of journalists, but the actual practice of the press.
Conclusion
Critics of the news media sometimes assert that the First Amend-
ment should not be read simply to protect media owners against gov-
ernment control, but also to protect the public against the
concentration in a few private corporate hands of the power to con-
trol the media and influence their content.227 In this view, the First
Amendment creates "a social right to a diverse and uncensored press"
that may be abridged not just by the government, but also by corpo-
rate domination of the media.228 This Article has identified a more
direct First Amendment problem with the actual practice of American
journalism, rooted not in a "social right to a diverse" media system,
but in the fundamental First Amendment concern that the press be
independent of the government.
In a formal legal sense, the American news media are indepen-
dent of the United States government. But when the Supreme Court
discusses the importance of a free press to our democracy, it envisions
a press that has not only the legal right to report critical perspectives
on government policy, but the willingness and the wherewithal to do
so in practice. 229 ThusJustice Black wrote in the Pentagon Papers case
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 147, at 257-58.
228. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
229. See supra Part III.
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not just about the rights of a free press, but about its "responsibili-
ties"-which include "the duty to prevent any part of the government
from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to
die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell."230 Based on the evi-
dence cited in this Article, the press needs to increase the distance
between itself and the government if the expectations of the First
Amendment are to be met.
As the Iraq War has demonstrated, the stakes in having the inde-
pendent press envisioned by the First Amendment are often high. Al-
though this Article has identified no law passed by Congress that
abridges the freedom of the press, the problem it describes should
concern students of the First Amendment. For the legal right of the
press to be independent of the government, however expansive and
secure it may be, has less significance than meets the eye ifjournalists,
in the actual practice of their craft, fail to exercise it.
230. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
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